Generic Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Large Crowding Games

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2757640

DOI10.1287/moor.25.3.349.12220zbMath1028.91002OpenAlexW2125772609MaRDI QIDQ2757640

Igal Milchtaich

Publication date: 26 November 2001

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.25.3.349.12220




Related Items (21)

The complexity of welfare maximization in congestion gamesThe uniqueness and well-posedness of vector equilibrium problems with a representation theorem for the solution setBounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion gamesOn the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Atomic Splittable Routing GamesRobust perfect equilibrium in large gamesNonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many typesA convergence analysis of the price of anarchy in atomic congestion gamesThe price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands.Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.Generic uniqueness of equilibrium pointsSocial optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games.Truthful mechanisms for selfish routing and two-parameter agentsDiscounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signalsComputing solutions of the multiclass network equilibrium problem with affine cost functionsPrice of anarchy for highly congested routing games in parallel networksThe uniqueness property for networks with several origin-destination pairsA geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion gamesThe price of anarchy in nonatomic consumption-relevance congestion gamesInformational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic CongestionOn the Price of Anarchy of Highly Congested Nonatomic Network GamesA game-theoretic perspective of deep neural networks




This page was built for publication: Generic Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Large Crowding Games