Undefinability of truth. the problem of priority:tarski vs gödel

DOI10.1080/01445349808837306zbMATH Open1052.03504OpenAlexW1970524747WikidataQ58573244 ScholiaQ58573244MaRDI QIDQ2757968FDOQ2757968

Roman Murawski

Publication date: 5 December 2001

Published in: History and Philosophy of Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01445349808837306

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03)

Cited In (10)

• The concept of truth in a finite universe
• Gödel, Escher, Bell: contextual semantics of logical paradoxes
• The scope of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem
• Zermelo and Set Theory
• Incompleteness and the halting problem
• Zermelo and Set Theory
• Gödel on Tarski
• On the ‘definability of definable’ problem of Alfred Tarski, Part II
• Gödel and Set Theory
• Undefinability vs. definability of satisfaction and truth

This page was built for publication: Undefinability of truth. the problem of priority:tarski vs gödel

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2757968)