Price of anarchy and control mechanisms in models of concordance of public and private interests

MaRDI QIDQ2833686zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Olga I. Gorbaneva, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ

Publication date 21 November 2016

Published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i eë Prilozheniya (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://mathnet.ru/eng/mgta152

zbMATH Keywords

administrative and economics control mechanismsGermeyer-Vatel modelprice of anarchypublic and private interests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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