A practical cryptanalysis of the Algebraic Eraser

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Publication:2835587

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_7zbMATH Open1351.94025arXiv1511.03870OpenAlexW2254391108MaRDI QIDQ2835587FDOQ2835587


Authors: Adi Ben-Zvi, Simon R. Blackburn, Boaz Tsaban Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 30 November 2016

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld and Lemieaux introduced the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP) as the concrete instantiation of their Algebraic Eraser scheme. This scheme, based on techniques from permutation groups, matrix groups and braid groups, is designed for lightweight environments such as RFID tags and other IoT applications. It is proposed as an underlying technology for ISO/IEC 29167-20. SecureRF, the company owning the trademark Algebraic Eraser, has presented the scheme to the IRTF with a view towards standardisation. We present a novel cryptanalysis of this scheme. For parameter sizes corresponding to claimed 128-bit security, our implementation recovers the shared key using less than 8 CPU hours, and less than 64MB of memory.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.03870




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