Vote-buying and growth

DOI10.1017/S1365100510000246MaRDI QIDQ2843371zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Felix Mühe

Publication date 22 August 2013

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100510000246

zbMATH Keywords

economic developmentpolitical economyvoting rulespoverty trapsvote-buyingrepeated voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic dynamics (91B55) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Sequential vote buying
• The power of voting and corruption cycles
• Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
• Strategic vote trading under complete information
• Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)
• CHILD LABOR AND THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Income Distribution and Macroeconomics
• Inequality and growth in a panel of countries
• Power to youth: designing democracy for long-term well-being
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• The economics of poverty traps. I: Complete markets

Cited in

(1)

• Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

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