Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
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Publication:2859057
DOI10.3982/ECTA7143zbMath1274.91332MaRDI QIDQ2859057
Publication date: 6 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7143
stability; consistency; core; complementarities; Nash bargaining; coalition formation; peer effects; many-to-one matching; sharing rules; assortative matching
91A12: Cooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B68: Matching models
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