Breaking `128-bit secure' supersingular binary curves. (Or how to solve discrete logarithms in F₂^4 1223 and F₂^12 367)

From MaRDI portal
Publication:2874534



Abstract: In late 2012 and early 2013 the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in finite fields of small characteristic underwent a dramatic series of breakthroughs, culminating in a heuristic quasi-polynomial time algorithm, due to Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux and Thom'e. Using these developments, Adj, Menezes, Oliveira and Rodr'iguez-Henr'iquez analysed the concrete security of the DLP, as it arises from pairings on (the Jacobians of) various genus one and two supersingular curves in the literature, which were originally thought to be 128-bit secure. In particular, they suggested that the new algorithms have no impact on the security of a genus one curve over mathbbF21223, and reduce the security of a genus two curve over mathbbF2367 to 94.6 bits. In this paper we propose a new field representation and efficient general descent principles which together make the new techniques far more practical. Indeed, at the `128-bit security level' our analysis shows that the aforementioned genus one curve has approximately 59 bits of security, and we report a total break of the genus two curve.





Cited in
(27)








This page was built for publication: Breaking `128-bit secure' supersingular binary curves. (Or how to solve discrete logarithms in \({\mathbb F}_{2^{4 \cdot 1223}}\) and \({\mathbb F}_{2^{12 \cdot 367}}\))

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2874534)