Masking with randomized look up tables. Towards preventing side-channel attacks of all orders
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Publication:2889770
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-28368-0_19zbMATH Open1300.94094OpenAlexW145209237WikidataQ62047262 ScholiaQ62047262MaRDI QIDQ2889770FDOQ2889770
Authors: Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon, François-Xavier Standaert, Christophe Petit
Publication date: 8 June 2012
Published in: Cryptography and Security: From Theory to Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28368-0_19
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Cited In (9)
- Higher order masking of look-up tables
- Masking tables -- an underestimated security risk
- Selected Areas in Cryptography
- Block ciphers that are easier to mask: how far can we go?
- Affine Masking against Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis
- Making masking security proofs concrete (or how to evaluate the security of any leaking device), extended version
- Time-memory trade-offs for side-channel resistant implementations of block ciphers
- Secret can be public: low-memory AEAD mode for high-order masking
- Cryptanalysis of masked ciphers: a not so random idea
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