iPIN and mTAN for secure eID applications

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_18MaRDI QIDQ2894366zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Johannes Braun, Moritz Horsch, Alexander Wiesmaier

Publication date 29 June 2012

Published in Information Security Practice and Experience (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_18

zbMATH Keywords

smartcardeIDidentity theftiPINman-in-the-middlemTANnPAonetime PINPIN compromise

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Stand-by attacks on E-ID password authentication
• Weaknesses in BankID, a PKI-Substitute Deployed by Norwegian Banks
• The Challenges Raised by the Privacy-Preserving Identity Card
• Using Multiple Smart Cards for Signing Messages at Malicious Terminals
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177023

Cited in

(4)

• Pseudonymous signature on eIDAS Token -- implementation based privacy threats
• Stand-by attacks on E-ID password authentication
• An Open Mobile Identity Tool: An Architecture for Mobile Identity Management
• Weaknesses in BankID, a PKI-Substitute Deployed by Norwegian Banks

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