RSA and elliptic curve least significant bit security
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Publication:2946472
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3750146 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 475434 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842493 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Simple Unpredictable Pseudo-Random Number Generator
- A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
- Bits Security of the Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Secret Keys
- Computational problems associated with Racah algebra
- Hardness of computing the most significant bits of secret keys in Diffie-Hellman and related schemes
- How to Generate Cryptographically Strong Sequences of Pseudorandom Bits
- New directions in cryptography
- On the bit security of the weak Diffie-Hellman problem
- Optimal Randomness Extraction from a Diffie-Hellman Element
- Practical Chosen Ciphertext Secure Encryption from Factoring
- RSA and Rabin Functions: Certain Parts are as Hard as the Whole
- Selecting cryptographic key sizes
- Stronger security proofs for RSA and Rabin bits.
- Systolic VLSI Arrays for Polynomial GCD Computation
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