RSA and elliptic curve least significant bit security
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Publication:2946472
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-16295-9_8zbMATH Open1378.94059OpenAlexW939065709MaRDI QIDQ2946472FDOQ2946472
Authors: Dionathan Nakamura, Routo Terada 
Publication date: 17 September 2015
Published in: Progress in Cryptology - LATINCRYPT 2014 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16295-9_8
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