Key recovery attacks on recent authenticated ciphers
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Publication:2946480
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-16295-9_15zbMATH Open1370.94490OpenAlexW976773762MaRDI QIDQ2946480FDOQ2946480
Authors: Andrey Bogdanov, Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Martin M. Lauridsen, Florian Mendel, Martin Schläffer, Elmar Tischhauser 
Publication date: 17 September 2015
Published in: Progress in Cryptology - LATINCRYPT 2014 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16295-9_15
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