Equilibria interchangeability in cellular games

DOI10.1093/LOGCOM/EXU054zbMATH Open1354.91013arXiv1402.1156OpenAlexW2962775254MaRDI QIDQ2957960FDOQ2957960

Authors: Pavel Naumov, Margaret Protzman 

Publication date: 31 January 2017

Published in: Journal Of Logic And Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The notion of interchangeability has been introduced by John Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria. This paper studies properties of Nash equilibria interchangeability in cellular games that model behavior of infinite chain of homogeneous economic agents. The paper shows that there are games in which strategy of any given player is interchangeable with strategies of players in an arbitrary large neighborhood of the given player, but is not interchangeable with the strategy of a remote player outside of the neighborhood. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing universal properties of interchangeability common to all cellular games.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.1156

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcompletenessaxiomatizationinterchangeabilitystrategic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Cited In (5)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Functional dependence in strategic games
• Strict equilibria interchangeability in multi-player zero-sum games
• Conditional interchangeability of Nash equilibria
• On interchangeability of Nash equilibria in multi-player strategic games

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