Equilibria interchangeability in cellular games

DOI10.1093/LOGCOM/EXU054MaRDI QIDQ2957960zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pavel Naumov, Margaret Protzman

Publication date 31 January 2017

Published in Journal Of Logic And Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.1156

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumcompletenessaxiomatizationinterchangeabilitystrategic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Abstract: The notion of interchangeability has been introduced by John Nash in one of his original papers on equilibria. This paper studies properties of Nash equilibria interchangeability in cellular games that model behavior of infinite chain of homogeneous economic agents. The paper shows that there are games in which strategy of any given player is interchangeable with strategies of players in an arbitrary large neighborhood of the given player, but is not interchangeable with the strategy of a remote player outside of the neighborhood. The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system describing universal properties of interchangeability common to all cellular games.

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