Inducing high service capacities in outsourcing \textit{via} penalty and competition
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Publication:2967583
DOI10.1080/00207543.2010.524262zbMATH Open1356.90020OpenAlexW2021074517MaRDI QIDQ2967583FDOQ2967583
Ximin Huang, Sin-Man Choi, Wai-Ki Ching
Publication date: 1 March 2017
Published in: International Journal of Production Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2010.524262
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Cites Work
- Markov chains: models, algorithms and applications
- Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Retailers Under Demand Uncertainty
- Price, delivery time guarantees and capacity selection
- Outsourcing via Service Competition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An inventory model for manufacturing systems with delivery time guarantees.
- Game theoretic enterprise management in industrial collaborative networks with multi-agent systems
- Minimizing the average tardiness: the case of outsource machines
Cited In (4)
- Service supply chain management: a review of operational models
- Outsourcing with quality competition: insights from a three-stage game-theoretic model
- Sourcing for quality: cooperating with a single supplier or developing two competing suppliers?
- Competitiveversuscooperative performances of a Stackelberg game between two suppliers
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