Robust Distributed Averaging: When are Potential-Theoretic Strategies Optimal?

DOI10.1109/TAC.2015.2477904zbMATH Open1359.91021arXiv1407.6075OpenAlexW2408197790MaRDI QIDQ2980481FDOQ2980481

Ali Khanafer, Tamer Başar

Publication date: 3 May 2017

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent the nodes from reaching consensus. Meanwhile, the network designer assists the nodes in reaching consensus by changing the weights of a limited number of links in the network. We formulate two Stackelberg games to describe this competition where the order in which the players act is reversed in the two problems. Although the canonical equations provided by the Pontryagin's maximum principle seem to be intractable, we provide an alternative characterization for the optimal strategies that makes connection to potential theory. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium for the underlying zero-sum game.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.6075

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cited In (3)

• Resilient synchronization of distributed multi-agent systems under attacks
• Optimal strategies in the average consensus problem
• Maximizing Convergence Time in Network Averaging Dynamics Subject to Edge Removal

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