Multicoalitional solutions

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.02.006zbMath1368.91014OpenAlexW4237499849MaRDI QIDQ298360

Stéphane Gonzalez, Michel Grabisch

Publication date: 20 June 2016

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01293785/file/multicoalitions.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

corecooperative gameaspiration corestrong Nash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Set-valued capacities: multi-agenda decision making ⋮ Optimal deterrence of cooperation

Cites Work

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• Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
• The coalition structure core is accessible
• Private information, transferable utility, and the core
• Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
• A comparison between the core and the monopoly solutions in a mixed exchange economy
• On market games when agents cannot be in two places at once
• Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Axiomatizing core extensions
• On the vertices of the \(k\)-additive core
• USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
• NONEMPTY CORE-TYPE SOLUTIONS OVER BALANCED COALITIONS IN TU-GAMES

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