A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem
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Publication:2989758
DOI10.1109/TIT.2012.2203582zbMATH Open1364.94534arXiv1205.5224OpenAlexW2133270269MaRDI QIDQ2989758FDOQ2989758
Authors: Nico Döttling, Rafael Dowsley, Joern Mueller-Quade, Anderson Nascimento
Publication date: 8 June 2017
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Differently from RSA and ElGa- mal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even tough McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding theory based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model - the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this work, we show the first construction of a McEliece based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Our construction is inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.5224
Cited In (9)
- On two modifications of the McEliece PKE and the CFS signature scheme
- Enhanced public key security for the McEliece cryptosystem
- Group encryption: full dynamicity, message filtering and code-based instantiation
- The McEliece-type cryptosystem based on \(D\)-codes
- Group encryption: full dynamicity, message filtering and code-based instantiation
- On the construction of a semantically secure modification of the McEliece cryptosystem
- A new security notion for PKC in the standard model: weaker, simpler, and still realizing secure channels
- Hybrid Encryption from McEliece Cryptosystem with Pseudo-random Error Vector
- IND-CCA2 secure McEliece-type modification in the standard model
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