A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem

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Publication:2989758

DOI10.1109/TIT.2012.2203582zbMATH Open1364.94534arXiv1205.5224OpenAlexW2133270269MaRDI QIDQ2989758FDOQ2989758


Authors: Nico Döttling, Rafael Dowsley, Joern Mueller-Quade, Anderson Nascimento Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 8 June 2017

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Differently from RSA and ElGa- mal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even tough McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding theory based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model - the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this work, we show the first construction of a McEliece based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Our construction is inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.5224







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