A second-price sealed-bid auction with verifiable discriminant of p _0-th root

DOI10.1007/3-540-36504-4_5MaRDI QIDQ2995362zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kazumasa Omote, Atsuko Miyaji

Publication date 20 April 2011

Published in Financial Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_5

zbMATH Keywords

economicsproof of knowledgepublic verifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

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• Which equilibrium yields the highest expected revenue in second-price sealed-bid auctions?

Cited in

(1)

• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

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