A second-price sealed-bid auction with verifiable discriminant of p _0-th root

DOI10.1007/3-540-36504-4_5zbMATH Open1275.91071OpenAlexW2096460354MaRDI QIDQ2995362FDOQ2995362

Kazumasa Omote, Atsuko Miyaji

Publication date: 20 April 2011

Published in: Financial Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_5

zbMATH Keywords

economicsproof of knowledgepublic verifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Cryptography (94A60) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cited In (1)

• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

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