Manipulative auction design
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Publication:3006636
DOI10.3982/TE687zbMath1215.91031MaRDI QIDQ3006636
Publication date: 20 June 2011
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (8)
Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues ⋮ The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions ⋮ First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders ⋮ Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium ⋮ Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions ⋮ Strategic interpretations ⋮ An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment ⋮ Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions
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