Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
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Publication:3012098
DOI10.1093/restud/rdq017zbMath1215.91083OpenAlexW2103168702MaRDI QIDQ3012098
Emre Ozdenoren, Itay Goldstein, Kathy Yuan
Publication date: 30 June 2011
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq017
learningfinancial marketscoordinationglobal gamesstrategic complementaritiesfeedback effectheterogeneous informationcurrency attacks
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)
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