Attack on broadcast RC4 revisited
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Publication:3013085
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_12zbMATH Open1282.94055OpenAlexW39401898MaRDI QIDQ3013085FDOQ3013085
Authors: Subhamoy Maitra, Goutam Paul, Sourav Sen Gupta
Publication date: 7 July 2011
Published in: Fast Software Encryption (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21702-9_12
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Cites Work
Cited In (25)
- On the evolution of GGHN cipher
- Proof of empirical RC4 biases and new key correlations
- Full plaintext recovery attack on broadcast RC4
- Novel strategies for searching RC4 key collisions
- Further clarification on Mantin's digraph repetition bias in RC4
- (Non-)random sequences from (non-)random permutations -- analysis of RC4 stream cipher
- Analysing and exploiting the Mantin biases in RC4
- Some proofs of joint distributions of keystream biases in RC4
- Glimpses are forever in RC4 amidst the spectre of biases
- Recovering RC4 Permutation from 2048 Keystream Bytes if j Is Stuck
- More glimpses of the RC4 internal state array
- Passive–Only Key Recovery Attacks on RC4
- RC4: non-randomness in the index \(j\) and some results on its cycles
- Settling the mystery of \(Z_{r} = r\) in RC4
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How to recover any byte of plaintext on RC4
- Proving TLS-attack related open biases of RC4
- Revisiting RC4 key collision: faster search algorithm and new 22-byte colliding key pairs
- Revisiting (nested) Roos bias in RC4 key scheduling algorithm
- How to find short RC4 colliding key pairs
- Further non-randomness in RC4, RC4A and VMPC
- Fast Software Encryption
- Security analysis of the RC4+ stream cipher
- A Practical Attack on Broadcast RC4
- On non-negligible bias of the first output byte of RC4 towards the first three bytes of the secret key
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