A Dynamic Nash Game Model of Oil Market Disruption and Strategic Stockpiling

DOI10.1287/opre.37.6.958zbMath0689.90012OpenAlexW2137928634MaRDI QIDQ3032035

Howard J. Weiss, Michael A. Toman, Frederic H. Murphy

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.6.958

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityuniquenessoptimal policiesNash dynamic gameoil inventory policiessteady-state policysubgame perfect infinite-horizon equilibriaunstable world oil markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Desirable policies of a strategic petroleum reserve in coping with disruption risk: a Markov decision process approach ⋮ Discounting axioms imply risk neutrality ⋮ On variational inequality approach to nash dynamic game of oil stockpiling^∗

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