Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00245zbMath1106.91327OpenAlexW2913527708MaRDI QIDQ3044081

Steven N. Kaplan, Per Strömberg

Publication date: 10 August 2004

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00245

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (19)

Hierarchical experimentation ⋮ Optimal exercise of jointly held real options: a Nash bargaining approach with value diversion ⋮ Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty ⋮ The complementarity effect: effort and sharing in the entrepreneur and venture capital contract ⋮ Staged financing: a trade-off theory of holdup and option value ⋮ Financing flexibility: the case of outsourcing ⋮ Security design with status concerns ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Selection of entrepreneurs in the venture capital industry: an asymptotic analysis ⋮ Debt, equity, and information ⋮ The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs ⋮ Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower-lender relationship ⋮ Risk sharing, risk shifting and the role of convertible debt ⋮ Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs ⋮ Venture capital financed investments in intellectual capital ⋮ Endogenous growth and adverse selection in entrepreneurship ⋮ The role of government in the venture capital market with asymmetric information ⋮ A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs ⋮ Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning

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