Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown

DOI10.3982/ECTA8565zbMath1207.91014MaRDI QIDQ3057836

Yuichi Yamamoto, Drew Fudenberg

Publication date: 17 November 2010

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationrepeated gamefolk theorempublic monitoringex post equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames ⋮ The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Repeated coordination with private learning ⋮ Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion

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