Honesty through repeated interactions

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2016.02.002MaRDI QIDQ306624zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Patricia Rich, Kevin J. S. Zollman

Publication date 1 September 2016

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2016.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

reputationcostly signalinghandicap theorySir Philip Sidney game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• The dynamics of costly signaling
• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?

Cited in

(3)

• Signals for reliability: A possibly harmful institution?
• Answers that Have Integrity
• Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling

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