Advice by an informed intermediary: can you trust your broker?

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1688zbMATH Open1229.91227OpenAlexW2031231435MaRDI QIDQ3075010FDOQ3075010

Authors: Anton Suvorov, Natalia Tsybuleva 

Publication date: 10 February 2011

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP121.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

advicecheap talkbilateral tradeinformed intermediary

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (4)

• Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information
• Brokers and competitive advantage
• Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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