Advice by an informed intermediary: can you trust your broker?

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1688MaRDI QIDQ3075010zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anton Suvorov, Natalia Tsybuleva

Publication date 10 February 2011

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cefir.ru/papers/WP121.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

advicecheap talkbilateral tradeinformed intermediary

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44) Trade models (91B60)

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Cited in

(4)

• Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information
• Brokers and competitive advantage
• Bilateral trade with a benevolent intermediary
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5010825 (Why is no real title available?)

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