Principal-agent approach to environmental improvements policies
DOI10.4064/BC90-0-13zbMATH Open1210.91095OpenAlexW2313697562MaRDI QIDQ3083396FDOQ3083396
Authors: Wojciech Szatzschneider, Teresa Kwiatkowska
Publication date: 21 March 2011
Published in: Banach Center Publications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4064/bc90-0-13
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Knightian uncertaintystochastic optimal controlprincipal-agentfinancial marketenvironmental improvements
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99) Optimal stochastic control (93E20)
Cited In (5)
- Optimal Environmental Targeting in the Amazon Rainforest
- New Perspectives for Environmental Policies Through Behavioral Economics
- Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator
- Computational Science - ICCS 2004
- Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality
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