Principal-agent approach to environmental improvements policies

DOI10.4064/BC90-0-13MaRDI QIDQ3083396zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wojciech Szatzschneider, Teresa Kwiatkowska

Publication date 21 March 2011

Published in Banach Center Publications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4064/bc90-0-13

zbMATH Keywords

Knightian uncertaintystochastic optimal controlprincipal-agentfinancial marketenvironmental improvements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99) Optimal stochastic control (93E20)

Recommendations

• Optimal environmental policy under imperfect information
• Environmental policies in a Stackelberg differential game
• Optimal implementation of environmental improvement policy with implementation costs
• A public-good approach to environmental economy
• New Perspectives for Environmental Policies Through Behavioral Economics
• Applied general equilibrium modeling for environmental policy analysis
• Optimal environmental policy differentials in open economies under emissions constraints
• The dynamics of optimal environmental regulation
• Policy evaluations under environmental constraints using a computable general equilibrium model

Cited in

(5)

• Optimal Environmental Targeting in the Amazon Rainforest
• Bargaining in environmental regulation and the ideal regulator
• New Perspectives for Environmental Policies Through Behavioral Economics
• Computational Science - ICCS 2004
• Computing business-as-usual with a representative agent and a pollution externality

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