INEQUALITY AVERSION AND THE OPTIMAL COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
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Recommendations
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Cites work
Cited in
(5)- REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY
- Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*
- Inequality aversion and risk aversion
- Inequality and government debt: evidence from OECD panel data
- Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision
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