INEQUALITY AVERSION AND THE OPTIMAL COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
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Publication:3089008
DOI10.1017/S1365100510000441zbMATH Open1219.91096OpenAlexW3124279293MaRDI QIDQ3089008FDOQ3089008
Authors: John Creedy, Shuyun May Li, Solmaz Moslehi
Publication date: 23 August 2011
Published in: Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/s1365100510000441
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Cites Work
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- REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY
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- Inequality and government debt: evidence from OECD panel data
- Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision
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