Throw one's cake -- and eat it too

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_8zbMATH Open1233.91159OpenAlexW1483828175MaRDI QIDQ3095260FDOQ3095260

Authors: Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb 

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_8

Recommendations

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cited In (7)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Toss one's cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting
• On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
• Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting
• Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
• On the computability of equitable divisions
• Sequential analogues of the Lyapunov and Krein-Milman theorems in Fréchet spaces

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