Throw one's cake -- and eat it too

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_8MaRDI QIDQ3095260zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Orit Arzi, Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb

Publication date 28 October 2011

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Welfare economics (91B15)

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(7)

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• On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2152231 (Why is no real title available?)
• Children crying at birthday parties. Why?
• On the computability of equitable divisions
• Toss one's cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting
• Sequential analogues of the Lyapunov and Krein-Milman theorems in Fréchet spaces

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