Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts

DOI10.1287/opre.1100.0828zbMath1228.90123OpenAlexW2028306415MaRDI QIDQ3098301

Che-Lin Su, David F. Larcker, Christopher S. Armstrong

Publication date: 17 November 2011

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=accounting_papers

zbMATH Keywords

mathematical programs with equilibrium constraintsexecutive compensationgeneralized principal-agent model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33)

Related Items (3)

Percentage rent contracts between co-stores ⋮ The impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard in R\&D project under uncertain environment ⋮ Globally convergent method for designing twice spline contractual function

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