Hard and soft preparation sets in Boolean games
DOI10.1007/S11225-015-9629-9zbMATH Open1422.91157OpenAlexW2218142403MaRDI QIDQ310097FDOQ310097
M. J. Wooldridge, Paul Harrenstein, Paolo Turrini
Publication date: 7 September 2016
Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10044/1/34529
coalition formationNash equilibriumexternalitiesBoolean gamespreparation setsset-valued solutions concepts
Cooperative games (91A12) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)
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- Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory
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- Hard and soft preparation sets in Boolean games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Incentive engineering for Boolean games
- Dependency in Cooperative Boolean Games
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- Dependencies between players in Boolean games
Cited In (2)
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