Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment

DOI10.1126/science.1141588zbMath1226.91010WikidataQ34643452 ScholiaQ34643452MaRDI QIDQ3101695

Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund, Christoph Hauert, Hannelore Brandt, Arne Traulsen

Publication date: 30 November 2011

Published in: Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2430058

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

91A22: Evolutionary games

91A90: Experimental studies

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