Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
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Publication:3101771
DOI10.1126/science.1183665zbMath1226.91014WikidataQ34112945 ScholiaQ34112945MaRDI QIDQ3101771
Herbert Gintis, Robert W. Boyd, Samuel Bowles
Publication date: 30 November 2011
Published in: Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1183665
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