Slow Dutch auctions
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Publication:3115455
DOI10.1287/MNSC.1040.0328zbMATH Open1232.91280DBLPjournals/mansci/CarareR05OpenAlexW3122843906WikidataQ56387776 ScholiaQ56387776MaRDI QIDQ3115455FDOQ3115455
Authors: Octavian Carare, Michael H. Rothkopf
Publication date: 21 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/39c2ff3f845820e34731c6904daa0c280ec21e13
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- Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
- Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
- Time is money: The effect of clock speed on seller's revenue in Dutch auctions
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- An optimal slow Dutch auction
- The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions
- Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
- Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice
- Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
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