Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model
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Publication:3116007
DOI10.1287/mnsc.1060.0541zbMath1232.90294MaRDI QIDQ3116007
Stefanos A. Zenios, Xuanming Su
Publication date: 21 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/606463366e781a82cfb81d21fc14007bbd3e9128
fluid queues; achievable regions; kidney allocation; design hidden information; efficiency-equity; trade-off mechanism
90B22: Queues and service in operations research
90B90: Case-oriented studies in operations research
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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