Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1060.0662zbMath1232.91286MaRDI QIDQ3116137

No author found.

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0662

zbMATH Keywords

core allocations; constraint generation; combinatorial auctions; bidder-Pareto optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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