Conceptions of truth in intuitionism

DOI10.1080/014453401625669zbMath1067.03009OpenAlexW1976751597WikidataQ57552563 ScholiaQ57552563MaRDI QIDQ3160445

Raatikainen, Panu

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: History and Philosophy of Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philarchive.org/rec/RAACOT

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (8)

Informational semantics, non-deterministic matrices and feasible deduction ⋮ From the knowability paradox to the existence of proofs ⋮ A MODAL TRANSLATION FOR DUAL-INTUITIONISTIC LOGIC ⋮ Antirealism and universal knowability ⋮ An intuitionist reasoning upon formal intuitionist logic: logical analysis of Kolmogorov's 1932 paper ⋮ On the Philosophy and Mathematics of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency ⋮ Truth as an epistemic notion ⋮ Structuring co-constructive logic for proofs and refutations

Cites Work

• Constructions, proofs and the meaning of logical constants
• Intuitionistic views on the nature of mathematics
• Heyting’s contribution to the change in research into the foundations of mathematics

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