A Provably Secure Signature and Signcryption Scheme Using the Hardness Assumptions in Coding Theory

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-12160-4_21zbMath1352.94053OpenAlexW2256649878MaRDI QIDQ3193273

Sachin Vasant, K. Preetha Mathew, C. Pandu Rangan

Publication date: 16 October 2015

Published in: Information Security and Cryptology -- ICISC 2013 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12160-4_21

zbMATH Keywords

signaturecode-based cryptographysigncryptionsyndrome decodingCFS signature

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

Related Items

On the security of the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier signature ⋮ A code-based group signature scheme

Uses Software

• McEliece

Cites Work

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