Modelling Ciphersuite and Version Negotiation in the TLS Protocol

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-19962-7_16zbMath1368.94096OpenAlexW1579363911MaRDI QIDQ3194602

Douglas Stebila, Benjamin Dowling

Publication date: 20 October 2015

Published in: Information Security and Privacy (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://eprints.qut.edu.au/86650/1/main_lncs.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cryptographic protocolsciphersuite negotiationdowngrade attackstransport layer security (tls)version negotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Network protocols (68M12)

Related Items (5)

Modelling Ciphersuite and Version Negotiation in the TLS Protocol ⋮ On the concrete security of TLS 1.3 PSK mode ⋮ A cryptographic analysis of the TLS 1.3 handshake protocol ⋮ On the tight security of TLS 1.3: theoretically sound cryptographic parameters for real-world deployments ⋮ KEMTLS with delayed forward identity protection in (almost) a single round trip

Cites Work

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• On the Security of the TLS Protocol: A Systematic Analysis
• Proving the TLS Handshake Secure (As It Is)
• On the Security of TLS-DHE in the Standard Model
• Tag Size Does Matter: Attacks and Proofs for the TLS Record Protocol
• Modelling Ciphersuite and Version Negotiation in the TLS Protocol
• A Modular Security Analysis of the TLS Handshake Protocol
• On the Security of the Pre-shared Key Ciphersuites of TLS

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