Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model
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Publication:3199168
DOI10.2307/2526848zbMath0713.90016MaRDI QIDQ3199168
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2526848
Pareto-optimal solutions; redistributive taxation; feedback Nash equilibrium; memory strategies; agreeable growth; dynamic noncooperative economic game
91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)
91B62: Economic growth models
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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