The Effects of Firm Optimizing Behaviour in Matching Models

DOI10.2307/2298090MaRDI QIDQ3199169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven E. Stern

Publication date 1990

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2298090

zbMATH Keywords

unemploymentscarring effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• An equilibrium theory of learning, search, and wages
• A theory of scar unemployment
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Matching with interviews
• Incentives in competitive search equilibrium

Cited in

(8)

• A Theory of Signalling During Job Search, Employment Efficiency, and "Stigmatised" Jobs
• Matching with interviews
• A theory of scar unemployment
• Endogenous dynamic efficiency in the intertemporal optimization models of firm behavior
• Welfare Effects of Dynamic Matching: An Empirical Analysis
• An equilibrium theory of learning, search, and wages
• Some empirical evidence on the `discouraged worker' effect
• Unemployment duration under flexible information acquisition

This page was built for publication: The Effects of Firm Optimizing Behaviour in Matching Models

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3199169)