Abstract: The aim of this article is twofold. First, we shall review and analyse the Neo-Kantian justification for the application of probabilistic concepts in physics that was defended by Hans Reichenbach early in his career, notably in his dissertation of 1916. At first sight this Kantian approach seems to contrast sharply with Reichenbach's later logical positivist, frequentist viewpoint. But, and this is our second goal, we shall attempt to show that there is an underlying continuity in Reichenbach's thought: typical features of his early Kantian conceptions can still be recognized in his later work.
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- Less is different: emergence and reduction reconciled
- On Hans Reichenbach's inductivism
- Reconsidering logical positivism
- Relativizing the relativized a priori: Reichenbach's axioms of coordination divided
- Reliability via synthetic a priori: Reichenbach's doctoral thesis on probability
Cited in
(10)- On Reichenbach's argument for scientific realism
- Reichenbach's cubical universe and the problem of the external world
- Reichenbach and Weyl on apriority and mathematical applicability
- The maxim of probabilism, with special regard to Reichenbach
- Hans Reichenbach's probability logic
- Dynamic probability and the problem of initial conditions
- On Hans Reichenbach's inductivism
- Relativizing the relativized a priori: Reichenbach's axioms of coordination divided
- Reliability via synthetic a priori: Reichenbach's doctoral thesis on probability
- Reichenbach's posits reposited
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