On the Bringer-Chabanne EPIR protocol for polynomial evaluation

DOI10.1515/JMC-2012-0001zbMATH Open1251.94024arXiv1208.5190OpenAlexW2166935119MaRDI QIDQ3225751FDOQ3225751

Liang Feng Zhang, Yeow Meng Chee, Huaxiong Wang

Publication date: 22 March 2012

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Extended private information retrieval (EPIR) was defined by cite{BCPT07} at CANS'07 and generalized by cite{BC09} at AFRICACRYPT'09. In the generalized setting, EPIR allows a user to evaluate a function on a database block such that the database can learn neither which function has been evaluated nor on which block the function has been evaluated and the user learns no more information on the database blocks except for the expected result. An EPIR protocol for evaluating polynomials over a finite field $L$ was proposed by Bringer and Chabanne in cite{BC09}. We show that the protocol does not satisfy the correctness requirement as they have claimed. In particular, we show that it does not give the user the expected result with large probability if one of the coefficients of the polynomial to be evaluated is primitive in $L$ and the others belong to the prime subfield of $L$.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1208.5190

zbMATH Keywords

correctnessextended private information retrieval

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60)

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