On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.007zbMATH Open1394.91028OpenAlexW2515387337MaRDI QIDQ324146FDOQ324146

Authors: Lei Qiao, Haomiao Yu, Zhixiang Zhang 

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.007

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumclosed-graph propertylarge game with traits (LGT)Lebesgue unit intervalNash equilibrium distributionsaturated probability space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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Cited In (5)

• The necessity of nowhere equivalence
• Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns
• Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games
• On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games
• On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games

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