On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.007zbMath1394.91028OpenAlexW2515387337MaRDI QIDQ324146

Mohammad Hasan, M. Dambrine

Publication date: 10 October 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumclosed-graph propertylarge game with traits (LGT)Lebesgue unit intervalNash equilibrium distributionsaturated probability space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns ⋮ On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games ⋮ Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games ⋮ On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games

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