On the closed-graph property of the Nash equilibrium correspondence in a large game: a complete characterization

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.07.007MaRDI QIDQ324146zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lei Qiao, Haomiao Yu, Zhixiang Zhang

Publication date 10 October 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.007

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumclosed-graph propertylarge game with traits (LGT)Lebesgue unit intervalNash equilibrium distributionsaturated probability space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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Cites work

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• Perfect and proper equilibria of large games
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• Pure strategy equilibria in games with private and public information
• Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
• Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games
• Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium
• Upper Hemi-Continuity of the Equilibrium-Set Correspondence for Pure Exchange Economies
• Why saturated probability spaces are necessary

Cited in

(5)

• The necessity of nowhere equivalence
• Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns
• Characterization of Nash equilibria of large games
• On the characterization of Nash equilibrium action distributions of large distributional games
• On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games

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