Differential Power Analysis of XMSS and SPHINCS
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3297557
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_10zbMath1450.94038OpenAlexW2797265718MaRDI QIDQ3297557
Juliane Krämer, Aymeric Genêt, Matthias J. Kannwischer, Denis Butin, Johannes A. Buchmann
Publication date: 20 July 2020
Published in: Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_10
Related Items (2)
First full-fledged side channel attack on HMAC-SHA-2 ⋮ Roadmap of post-quantum cryptography standardization: side-channel attacks and countermeasures
Uses Software
Cites Work
- The hash function \texttt{BLAKE}
- Grafting trees: a fault attack against the SPHINCS framework
- Towards Side-Channel Resistant Implementations of QC-MDPC McEliece Encryption on Constrained Devices
- SPHINCS: Practical Stateless Hash-Based Signatures
- Faster Hash-Based Signatures with Bounded Leakage
- XMSS - A Practical Forward Secure Signature Scheme Based on Minimal Security Assumptions
- Differential Power Analysis of MAC-Keccak at Any Key-Length
- Merkle Tree Traversal Revisited
- Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer
- W-OTS+ – Shorter Signatures for Hash-Based Signature Schemes
- Timing Attacks on NTRUEncrypt Via Variation in the Number of Hash Calls
- CMSS – An Improved Merkle Signature Scheme
- Cryptography and Coding
This page was built for publication: Differential Power Analysis of XMSS and SPHINCS