Realistic versus rational secret sharing

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-32430-8_10MaRDI QIDQ3297660zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yvo Desmedt, Arkadii Slinko

Publication date 20 July 2020

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.07581

zbMATH Keywords

backupcommon goodeconomic modelsgame theoryMPCPSMTsecret sharingthreshold cryptography

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Abstract: The study of Rational Secret Sharing initiated by Halpern and Teague regards the reconstruction of the secret in secret sharing as a game. It was shown that participants (parties) may refuse to reveal their shares and so the reconstruction may fail. Moreover, a refusal to reveal the share may be a dominant strategy of a party. In this paper we consider secret sharing as a sub-action or subgame of a larger action/game where the secret opens a possibility of consumption of a certain common good. We claim that utilities of participants will be dependent on the nature of this common good. In particular, Halpern and Teague scenario corresponds to a rivalrous and excludable common good. We consider the case when this common good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable and find many natural Nash equilibria. We list several applications of secret sharing to demonstrate our claim and give corresponding scenarios. In such circumstances the secret sharing scheme facilitates a power sharing agreement in the society. We also state that non-reconstruction may be beneficial for this society and give several examples.

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Cited in

(3)

• Socio-rational secret sharing as a new direction in rational cryptography
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1394307 (Why is no real title available?)
• Should Silence be Heard? Fair Rational Secret Sharing with Silent and Non-silent Players

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