Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3320078
DOI10.2307/2648754zbMath0535.90009WikidataQ56212389 ScholiaQ56212389MaRDI QIDQ3320078
Publication date: 1983
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ee8ac5b22eba512d4c1c2f53bae9b39562a308ec
91B14: Social choice
Related Items
Social Choice Theory, Implementation Theory, Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, A topological proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, A unifying impossibility theorem, The proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem revisited, An alternative proof of Fishburn's axiomatization of lexicographic preferences, An introduction to mechanized reasoning, Another direct proof for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted, Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach, Impossibility theorems are modified and unified, Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof, Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach, Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences, John A. Weymark, Salvador Barberà, Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel, A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice, On the manipulation of social choice correspondences, Gains from manipulating social choice rules, Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities, Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules, Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship
