On the Core and Dual Set of Linear Programming Games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.9.2.309MaRDI QIDQ3323732zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dov Samet, Eitan Zemel

Publication date 1984

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/485.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coremarket gamestotally balanced gameslinear programming gamesnecessary and sufficient condition for finite convergenceoptimal dual solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(24)

• Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
• Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations
• A core-allocation for a network restricted linear production game
• A note on the Owen set of linear programming games and Nash equilibria
• On the game-theoretic value of a linear transformation relative to a self-dual cone
• Averaged dual solution for linear production games and its characterization
• Revenue sharing for resource reallocation among project activity contractors
• Linearity of the core correspondence
• Collaboration in Cargo Transportation
• GAMES ARISING FROM INFINITE PRODUCTION SITUATIONS
• Characterization of the Owen set of linear production processes
• Stable Payment Schemes of Tu-Games With Multiple Crieria¹
• On characterization of the core of lane covering games via dual solutions
• Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder)
• Linear production games with committee control: limiting behaviour of the core.
• Managing decentralized inventory and transshipment
• Totally balanced games arising from controlled programming problems
• Computing payoff allocations in the approximate core of linear programming games in a privacy-preserving manner
• Stochastic programming, cooperation, and risk exchange
• On market prices in linear production games
• Aggregation in linear programming and in matrix games
• Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing.
• Dual cores and effectivity functions
• Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players

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