Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

DOI10.2307/2297780zbMath0545.90105MaRDI QIDQ3337250

Peter Cramton

Publication date: 1984

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1984-1989/84res-bargaining-with-incomplete-information.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learning; two-sided uncertainty; infinite-horizon bargaining model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91A12: Cooperative games

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

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