The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
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Publication:3352883
DOI10.2307/2938208zbMath0728.90107OpenAlexW2171915542MaRDI QIDQ3352883
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/68b9408990374ed9ebad558c68bc25e6d31f252d
private informationprincipal-agent relationshipWalrasian equilibriasequential games of incomplete informationthree-stage noncooperative game
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)
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