The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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Publication:3353030
DOI10.1137/0402048zbMath0729.05004MaRDI QIDQ3353030
Publication date: 1989
Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/0402048
60F05: Central limit and other weak theorems
05A05: Permutations, words, matrices
60C05: Combinatorial probability
05C70: Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.)
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